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Improving Consumer Protection: Lessons 
from the 2008 Recession 
Martha Coakley† & Alicia Daniel†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In 2007, a home foreclosure crisis began which would ulti-
mately drive the U.S. economy into the largest recession since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. State attorneys general (AGs) 
saw the devastating effects of foreclosure on communities and 
individual homeowners and stood at the forefront of addressing 
this crisis. The AGs investigated ways to hold large banks and 
investment giants accountable for their roles in the economic 
downturn, and these AGs achieved important successes for their 
respective states and for the nation as a whole. On the federal 
level, the Dodd-Frank Act and other measures were enacted to 
regulate financial institutions, whose recklessness had, in large 
part, caused the foreclosure crisis and the resulting recession.1 
Supporters of strong federal regulation argue that such regula-
tion is necessary to ensure basic consumer protections. On the 
other hand, opponents argue that such laws are nothing more 
than unnecessary constraints on financial institutions.2 These 
opponents, unfortunately, seem to have swiftly forgotten the les-
sons of the 2008 financial meltdown. By discussing the foreclo-
sure crisis and subsequent crash from the perspective of a state 
attorney general—a perspective that one of this Article’s authors 
 
†  Former Massachusetts Attorney General. Thanks to Peace Ibe, second-
year student at Boston University School of Law and integral member of our 
authorship team, for her invaluable research and writing contributions. Copy-
right © 2019 by Martha Coakley. 
†† Associate, Foley Hoag LLP. Copyright © 2019 by Alicia Daniel. 
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2. See Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back 
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personally held during the crisis—this Article hopes to fight back 
against this political and economic amnesia. 
This Article examines the steps U.S. attorneys general took 
to achieve and maintain effective consumer financial protec-
tions. Part I briefly summarizes the foreclosure crisis and the 
factors that contributed to the economic downturn. Part II out-
lines states’ legal action and legislative solutions in response to 
the foreclosure crisis, highlighting the nationwide state-federal 
settlement. Part III examines the Massachusetts HomeCorps 
program, a multi-faceted initiative designed to prevent unneces-
sary foreclosures. Finally, Part IV considers the current state of 
consumer financial protection, including post-crisis federal reg-
ulation and the possible weakening of those laws under the cur-
rent administration. Part V discusses the need for consumer 
safeguards and the necessary relationship between the federal 
government and state AGs to maintain the safeguards. 
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS   
Across the country, more than 5 million people lost their 
homes to foreclosure during the crisis.3 Generally, American fed-
eral housing policy comprises Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (gov-
ernment-sponsored entities), the Federal Housing Administra-
tion, and mortgage tax deductions.4 By supporting this policy, 
the federal government allowed homeowners and buyers to have 
better access to credit and loan products. During the early to 
mid-2000s, high-risk mortgages became available to high-risk 
borrowers.5 Beginning in 1998, the federal government steadily 
chipped away at financial regulations, allowing even lenders in-
sured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to 
engage in unsustainable, high-stakes gambling for the sake of 
short-term profit.6 As a result, the number of subprime loans—
that is, loans available to borrowers with poor credit scores7—
 
 3. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., REBUILDING THE COMMONWEALTH: RE-
COVERING FROM THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND SETTING THE FOUNDATION FOR 
FUTURE SUCCESS 5 (Apr. 2014), https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/08/ 
oz/homecorps-report.pdf. 
 4. N. ERIC WEISS & KATIE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017), https://fas 
.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42995.pdf. 
 5. Steve Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES 
(Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/ 
#1ef34a3bf92f. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Jeff Cox, Big Banks Have Found a New Way to Stay in the Subprime 
  
2019] IMPROVING CONSUMER PROTECTION 2479 
 
nearly doubled from 2003 to 2005.8 Consumers’ access to credit 
dramatically increased, including that of homebuyers who were 
previously unable to obtain mortgages (often because of faulty 
credit history or lack of a down payment).9 
Unmonitored and unregulated companies issued a tremen-
dous amount of risky debt, knowing that if the housing market 
did not continue to climb, the mortgages they issued would 
surely end in default. Almost immediately, the inevitable hap-
pened. Home prices stalled in 2005, then dropped the following 
year.10 Owners stopped making mortgage payments due to in-
creased interest and because they now owed more on these mort-
gages than their properties were worth.11 Lenders’ and investors’ 
mortgage loss rates skyrocketed.12 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
who had issued debt to fund purchases of these high-risk mort-
gages, suffered losses due to the failing mortgages.13 The federal 
government seized these two entities in the summer of 2008 and 
placed them into a conservatorship that the Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (FHFA) ran.14 
The foreclosure crisis affected the entire U.S. economy. It 
lowered construction rates, affected consumer interests, and par-
alyzed financial firm lending.15 Ultimately, the crisis spiraled 
into the 2008 global financial meltdown. State AGs first tried to 
fight the crisis within their own state bounds, which proved 
largely ineffective against national and international financial 
institutions. Therefore, AGs started to work together to begin an 
intensive investigation and ultimately negotiate the largest joint 
state-federal settlement in history. 
 
Lending Business, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/big 
-banks-have-found-a-new-way-to-stay-in-the-subprime-lending-business.html. 
 8. Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 27, 36 (2009). 
 9. Id. at 48. 
 10. Denning, supra note 5. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. MARTIN NEIL BAILY ET AL., INST. ON BUS. & POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE 
OBSTACLES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/2016/06/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf; Neil Irwin & Zach-
ary A. Goldfarb, U.S. Seizes Control of Mortgage Giants, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/07/ 
AR2008090700259.html.  
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II.  ATTORNEYS’ GENERAL EFFORTS IN HOLDING 
LENDERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE FORECLOSURE 
CRISIS   
State AGs were among the first responders to the burgeon-
ing foreclosure crisis, and Massachusetts was on the front lines. 
In 2007, the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office (MA Of-
fice) released a summary report describing the newly enacted 
consumer protection regulations governing mortgage lenders 
and brokers entitled The American Dream Shattered: The Dream 
of Homeownership and the Reality of Predatory Lending.16 The 
report included a summary of statewide hearings addressing 
proposed mortgage regulations from September of that year.17 It 
also included an analysis of resident and business concerns in 
Massachusetts, as well as local, state, and federal officials con-
sidering remedies to address the foreclosure crisis.18 Also in 
2007, the MA Office enacted emergency regulations which 
barred “foreclosure rescue schemes”19—scams that targeted in-
dividuals whose homes were facing potential foreclosure, prey-
ing on desperate homeowners and stealing any home equity they 
had.20 The report and the emergency regulations stressed the 
need for stronger consumer protections to make the mortgage-
lending marketplace more transparent and fair.21 
In February 2008, the Massachusetts Superior Court issued 
the first order in the nation to prohibit a lender (in this case, 
Fremont Investment & Loan and Fremont General Corporation) 
from foreclosing on certain “[p]resumptively [u]nfair” mortgage 
loans because the loans posed an unacceptable risk of default 
and foreclosure.22 Fremont was issuing mortgages to borrowers 
 
 16. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., THE AMERICAN DREAM SHATTERED: 
THE DREAM OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND THE REALITY OF PREDATORY LENDING 
(2007), https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/113761/ 
ocn769685807.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 17. Id. at 15–22. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Legislative Solutions for Preventing Loan Modification and Foreclosure 
Rescue Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of 
the Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 7 (2009) (statement of Martha Coakley, 
Att’y Gen. of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts). 
 20. See STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW 
CTR., DREAMS FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT THEFT OF AMERCANS’ HOMES 
THROUGH EQUITY-STRIPPING FORECLOSURE “RESCUE” SCAMS (2005), https:// 
www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/scam/report-foreclosure-rescue 
-scams-2005.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLS1, 2008 
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whose incomes could not support their mortgage payments, lur-
ing them in with a low introductory rate and then dramatically 
increasing their monthly payments after a few years.23 Massa-
chusetts alleged that these subprime mortgage loans violated 
several state laws and were predatory because borrowers were 
unlikely to be able to repay the loans.24 The court performed a 
groundbreaking analysis of the risky mortgages that Fremont 
and others lenders were issuing that contributed to the foreclo-
sure crisis. The order described the factors that entrapped home-
owners and led to innumerable foreclosures: low introductory 
rates, which quickly became significantly higher; the use of the 
introductory rates (not the permanent rates) to determine 
whether borrowers’ incomes qualified them for the loans; and the 
borrowers’ inability to refinance their mortgages because of pre-
payment penalties or high loan-to-value ratios on their homes.25 
Where these conditions were present, the court recognized that 
borrowers were effectively trapped in mortgages which Fremont 
should have known they could not afford.26 Fremont was re-
quired to obtain approval from the attorney general or, if the at-
torney general did not grant approval, from the court, before 
foreclosing upon mortgages.27 The Supreme Judicial Court up-
held this decision in December of 2008.28 The superior court’s 
analysis, as well as its apparent determination that the state en-
forcement in this area was not preempted by federal law, set the 
stage for state AGs to become more active participants in holding 
lenders accountable for the foreclosure crisis.  
After the Fremont decisions, the MA Office sent letters to 
four major lenders, Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells 
Fargo, and Ally, calling upon them to cease foreclosures in light 
of revelations regarding widespread foreclosure fraud in Massa-
chusetts.29 When these lenders refused to address the MA Of-
fice’s consumer protection concerns, Massachusetts was the first 
 
WL 517279, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008), aff ’d, 847 N.E.2d. 548 (Mass. 
2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, § 4 (2008). 
 25. See Fremont, 2008 WL 517279, at *1–17. 
 26. Finding Massachusetts was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim, 
the court granted the Commonwealth’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. 
at *16–17. The restriction remained in place pending final adjudication or fur-
ther order of the court. Id. at *16. 
 27. See id. at *1. 
 28. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 562 (Mass. 
2008). 
 29. See Diana Olick, First Major State Lawsuit Filed Over “Robo-Signing,” 
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state to take them to court for fraudulent foreclosure documen-
tation processing.30 Of course, Massachusetts was not the only 
place where these lenders were illegally foreclosing. These 
abuses affected homeowners across the country.31 State AGs 
faced an insurmountable task in waging separate battles against 
various lending giants in an effort to get relief for their constitu-
ents.32 However, states working together in a multi-state inves-
tigation would have much more clout. Beginning in October 
2010, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller led a coalition of state 
AGs in talks with numerous lenders that were accused of fore-
closure fraud.33 These negotiations aimed to resolve allegations 
that five of the country’s largest banks committed unlawful fore-
closures, including the robo-signing of documents.34 
The Justice Department and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development joined the state AGs, forging a unique 
state and federal partnership to vindicate consumers.35 After 
over a year of negotiations, the states finally reached an agree-
ment with the lenders to hold the lenders accountable for their 
role in the foreclosure crisis and subsequent meltdown, as well 
as to provide meaningful relief for American homeowners.36 The 
terms of the settlement—which was approved by the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia on April 4, 201237—re-
quired five major financial institutions (Bank of America, J.P. 
 
CNBC (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.cnbc.com/id/45511868; Jon Prior, Coakley 
Promises Large Penalties for Robo-Signing, HOUSINGWIRE (Dec. 1, 2011), 
https://www.housingwire.com/articles/coakley-promises-large-penalties-robo 
-signing. 
 30. Olick, supra note 29. 
 31. Jeremiah S. Buckley, State Attorneys General Are the New Bank Regu-
lators, AM. BANKER (Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
opinion/state-attorneys-general-are-the-new-bank-regulators. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Jon Prior, Mortgage Servicers Sign $26 Billion Foreclosure Settlement, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/mortgage 
-servicers-sign-26-billion-foreclosure-settlement. 
 34. Cf. Carole Fleck, $25 Billion Deal Reached to Aid Distressed Homeown-
ers, AARP (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.aarp.org/money/credit-loans-debt/info-02 
-2012/robo-signed-foreclosures.html (discussing the settlement). Robo-signing 
is “a term used by consumer advocates to describe the signing of foreclosure or 
bankruptcy by individuals with no knowledge of the facts underlying such doc-
uments.” Julia Kagan, Robo-Signer, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www 
.investopedia.com/terms/r/robo-signer.asp. 
 35. Prior, supra note 33. 
 36. Id. 
 37. National Mortgage Settlement, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice 
.gov/ust/national-mortgage-settlement (last updated Jan. 18, 2017). 
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Morgan Chase, Citi, Wells Fargo, and Ally) to provide cash pay-
ments to states, and included other obligations such as injunc-
tive relief going forward.38 The $25 billion settlement was the 
largest joint federal-state civil settlement in history.39 The set-
tlement’s structure included billions of dollars in direct pay-
ments to homeowners, payments to state and federal govern-
ments, and various new homeowner protections.40 The 
agreement established new mortgage loan servicing and foreclo-
sure standards, which created new consumer protections.41 The 
standards of the agreement were focused on the need for trans-
parency.42 
As Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan indicated, 
“[w]hile the settlement [was] a big step forward in our efforts, it 
[was] not the end.”43 The national settlement was a starting 
point for many AGs who, in their respective states, used the set-
tlements for consumer relief. In Massachusetts, this innovative 
attitude led to founding the HomeCorps program, which is de-
scribed in the next Part. 
III.  NATIONAL SETTLEMENT GIVES RISE TO 
MASSACHUSETTS’ HOMECORPS PROGRAM   
More than 45,000 people in Massachusetts lost their homes 
to foreclosure during the crisis.44 The national mortgage settle-
ment guaranteed Massachusetts residents $318 million in assis-
tance, $44.5 million of which was paid directly to the state.45 Us-
ing the remaining funds from the national state-federal 
mortgage foreclosure settlement, the Massachusetts Attorney 
General’s Office launched HomeCorps, a statewide foreclosure 
 
 38. Joseph A. Smith Jr., A Review and Assessment of the National Mortgage 
Settlement by Its Monitor, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 29, 31–32 (2017) (discussing 
the obligations the Servicers agreed to in exchange for a release from liability). 
 39. Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion 
Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Ser-
vicing and Foreclosure Abuses, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www 
.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25 
-billion-agreement-five-largest. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Madigan, Federal Government & State Attorneys General Secure $25 
Billion Settlement with Nation’s Five Largest Banks, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 9, 
2012), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2012_02/20120209 
.html. 
 44. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 3, at 7. 
 45. Id. at 18. 
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prevention and borrower support initiative.46 The goal of Home-
Corps was to mitigate current and future impacts of the foreclo-
sure crisis by providing relief to individual borrowers in Massa-
chusetts who were facing foreclosure.47 HomeCorps also set the 
foundation for future economic and consumer success.48 
Another element of HomeCorps was the HomeCorps Grant 
Funding Initiative, a system of grant programs collectively 
worth more than $26 million.49 This initiative provided funds to 
organizations and programs that supported housing recovery ef-
forts.50 The grants were devoted to providing legal representa-
tion for distressed borrowers, supporting foreclosed residents 
looking for new places to live, and identifying and responding to 
neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates and abandoned 
homes.51 Through the Abandoned Housing Initiative, the MA Of-
fice, with Massachusetts cities and towns, encouraged willing 
delinquent owners to repair their homes and obtain security.52 
The MA Office worked with the relevant courts to eliminate the 
health and safety risks the abandoned homes posed by bringing 
the properties up to sanitary code.53 
In 2011, State Senator Karen Spilka, State Representative 
Steven Walsh, and Attorney General Martha Coakley filed Mas-
sachusetts House Bill 4323: An Act Preventing Unlawful and 
Unnecessary Foreclosures.54 This bill mandated loan modifica-
tions to certain high-risk home mortgages when such modifica-
tions were in the financial interest of the borrower and the 
lender.55 It provided the parties an opportunity to modify these 
loans so that the borrower could afford the monthly payments 
and the lender would not have to foreclose on the home and sell 
it at a loss.56 The bill also required that foreclosing entities pro-
vide documentation of the chain of mortgage assignments back 
to the original mortgagee, proving their legal right to foreclose.57 
 
 46. Id. at 19. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 32. 
 53. Id.  
 54. 2012 Mass. Acts 973. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Massachusetts House Bill 4323: An Act Preventing Unlawful and Un-
necessary Foreclosures, SALTER MCGOWAN SYLVIA & LEONDARD, https://www 
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Then-governor Deval Patrick signed the bill into law on August 
3, 2012.58 The new law paired well with HomeCorps’ goal of mit-
igating future impacts of the foreclosure crisis by providing ad-
vocacy to distressed borrowers in Massachusetts facing foreclo-
sure.59 To achieve this goal, HomeCorps increased the number of 
loan modification specialists to ensure distressed borrowers re-
ceive adequate support.60 
Following the launch of HomeCorps, Massachusetts’ foreclo-
sure rates largely stayed below national averages and, as a gen-
eral matter, the Massachusetts housing market began recover-
ing quicker than most other states at the time.61 By 2014, 
HomeCorps recovered more than $850 million from seventeen 
national banks and lenders, which was provided to Massachu-
setts homeowners and investors and used in efforts to further 
consumer protection from foreclosure fraud and to keep resi-
dents in their homes.62 
The efforts to strengthen consumer protections continued af-
ter the state-federal settlement. Many state AGs launched their 
own initiatives and steadfastly prosecuted mortgage fraud 
cases.63 Meanwhile, federal legislators were busy enacting laws 
geared towards consumer protection to keep borrowers from abu-
sive lending and mortgage practices, as described in the next 
Part. 
IV.  THE CURRENT STATE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION   
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).64 This law 
placed regulations on the financial industry and was enacted as 
a means to “promote the long-term sustainability of the U.S. fi-
nancial system.”65 To achieve this goal, Dodd-Frank created sev-
 
.smsllaw.com/massachusetts-house-bill-4323-an-act-preventing-unnecessary 
-and-unlawful-foreclosures (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 58. H.R. 4323, 2012 Leg., 207th Sess. (Mass. 2012). 
 59. MASS. OFFICE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 3, at 24. 
 60. Id. at 19. 
 61. Id. at 7. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Buckley, supra note 31. 
 64. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 65. Mary Jo White, Statement on the Anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
SEC (July 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-the 
-anniversary-of-the-dodd-frank-act.html.  
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eral agencies and councils. Among these agencies was the Con-
sumer and Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).66 
The CFPB was established to protect consumers from finan-
cial institutions’ illegal and harmful practices.67 Before the 
CFPB was created, several agencies shared the responsibility of 
enforcing federal consumer financial protection laws.68 The var-
ious agencies in place prior to Dodd-Frank and during the finan-
cial crisis included the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency; the Office of Thrift Supervision; the Na-
tional Credit Union Administration; the Federal Trade Commis-
sion; and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.69 
Each of these agencies focused on regulating a particular type of 
institution, but none were solely devoted to consumer protec-
tion.70 
After the crisis, these agencies were individually inadequate 
to repair the economy and protect consumers, which led to Dodd 
Frank and the CFPB.71 The CFPB’s creation consolidated re-
sponsibility for consumer protection to a single enforcer. In a 
blog post summarizing the CFPB’s mission, Senator Elizabeth 
Warren (at the time, Assistant to the President and Special Ad-
visor to the Treasury Secretary)72 noted the need for the con-
sumer bureau on the basis that “people ought to be able to read 
their credit card and mortgage contracts and know the deal.”73 
 
 66. Daniel Bush, What Is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Any-
way?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
economy/making-sense/what-is-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau 
-anyway. 
 67. Id. 
 68. CFPB, BUILDING THE CFPB: A PROGRESS REPORT 9 (July 18, 2011), 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf. 
 69. BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DODD-FRANK WALL 
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: BACKGROUND AND SUM-
MARY 11 (Apr. 21, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41350.pdf. 
 70. CFPB, supra note 68, at 8. 
 71. Martin Neil Bailey et al., The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Finan-
cial Stability and Economic Growth, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 20, 
29–30 (2017) (stating that the creation of the CFPB consolidated the oversight 
of seven different agencies, “leaving fewer gaps in the regulatory infrastruc-
ture”). 
 72. Jackie Calmes & Sewell Chan, Obama Picks Warren to Set Up Con-
sumer Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/ 
18/us/politics/18warren.html. 
 73. Elizabeth Warren, Fighting to Protect Consumers, WHITEHOUSE.GOV 
(Sept. 17, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/09/17/ 
fighting-protect-consumers. 
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Senator Warren and President Obama intended for the CFPB to 
“level[]  the playing field” between consumers and the consumer 
credit market.74 
In its efforts to achieve this goal and hold financial institu-
tions accountable, the CFPB has handled over 1 million con-
sumer complaints and has created an efficient platform for con-
sumers to file their complaints.75 The CFPB has recovered over 
12 billion dollars in consumer relief by enforcing federal con-
sumer financial laws and holding financial service providers an-
swerable for their actions.76 For example, the CFPB fined Wells 
Fargo $100 million (the largest penalty the CFPB has ever im-
posed) “for the widespread illegal practice of secretly opening un-
authorized deposit and credit card accounts,”77 and sued Citi-
Bank subsidiaries for failing to provide full disclosure to 
consumers applying for foreclosure relief.78 
Critics have fervently scrutinized the CFPB, despite the re-
sults the agency has achieved on behalf of consumers.79 Scholars 
have examined the agency’s broad authority and discretion, its 
immunity from congressional oversight and presidential influ-
ence, and its protection from judicial interference.80 Many have 
argued that these factors demonstrate the agency’s unconstitu-
tionality, meaning that the agency lacks the authority to take 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Gretchen Morgenson, The Watchdog Protecting Consumers May Be Too 
Effective, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/ 
business/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-gretchen-morgenson.html. 
 76. CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov (last updated June 4, 2018). 
 77. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million 
for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts, 
CFPB (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/ 
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million 
-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-unauthorized-accounts. 
 78. Enforcement Actions, CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy 
-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
 79. Jackie Wattles & Matt Egan, Why Wall Street and Republicans Hate 
the CFPB, CNN MONEY (Nov. 27, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/25/ 
news/wall-street-elizabeth-warren-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/ 
index.html. 
 80. See, e.g., William Simpson, Above Reproach: How the Consumer Finan-
cial Protection Bureau Escapes Constitutional Checks & Balances, 36 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 343, 345 (2016) (examining the agency’s “self-funding struc-
ture . . . coupled with its unique independent status exempt from much execu-
tive and congressional oversight”). 
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enforcement actions. This debate has been the subject of fre-
quent litigation in which defendants counterclaim, questioning 
the constitutionality of the CFPB.81 
In PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that the federal statute providing the 
CFPB Director with a five-year term in office, subject to removal 
by the President only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-
sance in office,” is consistent with Article II of the Constitution.82 
Article II mandates that the President of the United States 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”83 In discussing 
the reasons that Congress initially established the CFPB, the 
court found the power vested in the CFPB analogous to the pow-
ers vested in the independent Federal Trade Commission.84 The 
court relied on an earlier Supreme Court case, Humphrey’s Ex-
ecutor v. United States,85 to validate the design and structure of 
independent agencies, including the unique structure of the 
CFPB.86 
Nevertheless, the current administration has dissolved 
many of the rules enacted after the financial crisis, including 
making significant changes to the CFPB structure.87 Senator 
Warren noted in an interview that, “[o]n the 10th anniversary of 
an enormous financial crash, Congress should not be passing 
 
 81. Eric Pearson, A Brief Essay on the Constitutionality of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 99, 104–22 (2013) (discuss-
ing the structure and constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau). 
 82. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 84. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 92–94 (“Congress validly decided that the 
CFPB needed a measure of independence and chose a constitutionally accepta-
ble means to protect it. . . . [T]he CFPB’s function is remarkably similar to that 
of the FTC, a consumer protection agency that has operated for more than a 
century with the identical for-cause protection, approved by a unanimous Su-
preme Court.”). 
 85. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 86. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 78. However, a New York court reached a con-
flicting result when it ruled the CFPB unconstitutional in 2018. CFPB v. RD 
Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 87. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr. et al., How Trump Appointees Curbed a Con-
sumer Protection Agency Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/how-trump-appointees-curbed 
-a-consumer-protection-agency-loathed-by-the-gop/2018/12/04/3cb6cd56-de20 
-11e8-aa33-53bad9a881e8_story.html?utm_term=.42e738cde2f2 (“One year af-
ter Mulvaney’s arrival, he and his political aides have constrained the agency 
from within . . . . Mulvaney and a team of political appointees used the levers of 
government to hinder career employees and roll back oversight of private indus-
try.”). 
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laws to roll back regulations on Wall Street banks.”88 Yet this is 
exactly what Congress and the executive branch have been do-
ing. In May 2018, Congress passed the Economic Growth, Regu-
latory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (the Act).89 The Act 
authorizes federal regulators to narrow or eliminate many of the 
regulations Dodd Frank created for banks, including liquidity 
risk-management standards and supervisory requirements.90 In 
November 2017, President Trump appointed a former congress-
man and director of the federal Office of Management and 
Budget, Mick Mulvaney, as acting director of the CFPB.91 Mul-
vaney conducted various efforts to change the structure of the 
CFPB, including changing the agency’s name to the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP).92 In June 2018, he fired 
the BCFP’s entire twenty-five-member Consumer Advisory 
Board93 pursuant to the restructured agency’s reformed mission 
of “regularly identifying and addressing outdated, unnecessary, 
or unduly burdensome regulations.”94 
 
 88. Erica Werner & Damian Paletta, 10 Years After Financial Crisis, Sen-




 89. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, S. 
2155, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th 
-congress/senate-bill/2155. 
 90. Samuel R. Woodall III et al., “Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act” Is Enacted, PROGRAM ON CORP. COMPLIANCE & EN-
FORCEMENT N.Y.U. (June 5, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_ 
enforcement/2018/06/05/economic-growth-regulatory-relief-and-consumer 
-protection-act-is-enacted. 
 91. Court Decision Leaves White House’s Mulvaney in Place as Acting Head 
of CFPB, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/28/court 
-decision-leaves-white-houses-mulvaney-in-place-as-acting-head-of-cfpb.html; 
Mulvaney, Mick, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide 
.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M001182 (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). 
 92. See O’Harrow, supra note 87 (“Mulvaney adopted a new seal that 
changed the agency’s name. The new name, Bureau for Consumer Financial 
Protection, scrambled a widely used acronym that the agency had spent tens of 
millions of dollars to promote.”); Emily Stewart, Mick Mulvaney Changed the 
CFPB’s Sign to BCFP, VOX (June 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and 
-politics/2018/6/11/17451292/mick-mulvaney-cfpb-bcfp. 
 93. Acting Director Mulvaney Fires Members of Advisory Board of Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, Endangering Financial Well-Being of 
American Families, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. (June 6, 2018), https://www.nclc 
.org/media-center/mulvaney-fires-members-of-advisory-board.html. 
 94. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Issues Statement on the Im-
plementation of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protec-
tion Act Amendments to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, CFPB (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bureau-consumer 
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V.  WHAT AMERICANS NEED NOW   
Now, ten years after the height of the 2008 financial crisis, 
the United States is benefitting from the longest bull market in 
its history.95 Banks are profitable again, and the housing and 
stock markets are reaching record highs.96 Yet experts 
acknowledge that in many respects, the 2008 crash’s damage is 
permanent, and some worry that the economy may be headed for 
another foreclosure crisis as banks begin eyeing new ways to 
grant risky mortgages.97 As increases in the cost of rent far out-
pace the growth of wages,98 more people consider taking out un-




-disclosure-act; see O’Harrow, supra note 87 (“On Dec. 21 [2017] . . . career em-
ployees took note of a subtle but significant change to language describing the 
agency’s mission in news releases. In addition to protecting consumers, the bu-
reau was now ‘regularly identifying and addressing outdated, unnecessary or 
unduly burdensome regulations,’ the new language said.”). 
 95. Matt Egan, Market Milestone: This Is the Longest Bull Run in History, 
CNN BUS. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/22/investing/bull 
-market-longest-stocks/index.html. 
 96. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., Inviting the Next Financial Crisis, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/opinion/ 
economy-financial-crisis.html (“The housing market, once crippled by foreclo-
sures, has sprung back to life . . . . Banks, once dependent on taxpayer dollars 
to keep their doors open, are raking in profits.”); Adam Shell, S&P 500 Hits 
Record High as Earnings Eclipse Trade War Fears, USA TODAY (Aug. 21, 
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/08/21/stocks-hit-record 
-highs/922315002 (“The Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index, a broad gauge of the 
U.S. stock market, hit a fresh all-time high . . . . [This] period of rising stock 
prices . . . puts the large-company stock index on track Wednesday to eclipse the 
1990’s bull market as the longest in history.”). 
 97. N.Y. Times Editorial Bd., supra note 96 (“The per capita gross domestic 
product of the United States is about $70,000 smaller over the average person’s 
lifetime than it would have been had the economy stayed on the trajectory it 
had been before the crisis . . . . [T]he economy is ‘unlikely to regain’ that lost 
ground, a stunning acknowledgment of the permanent and significant costs of 
avoidable financial crises.”); Jorge Newbery, Are We Headed for Another Fore-
closure Crisis?, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
forbesrealestatecouncil/2017/12/08/are-we-headed-for-another-foreclosure 
-crisis/#40aa32875ecf (“Ten years later [after the Great Recession and the burst 
of the U.S. housing bubble], low- or no-down-payment mortgages may be mak-
ing a comeback. . . . [T]hey may herald a worrisome trend that could lead to a 
repeat of our last housing crisis.”). 
 98. THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., AMERICAN FAMILIES FACE A GROWING 
RENT BURDEN 4 (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and 
-analysis/reports/2018/04/american-families-face-a-growing-rent-burden (not-
ing “a rapid increase in rental market prices that has outpaced household in-
comes for many families”). 
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scrambling to let them.99 More federal safeguards are disappear-
ing by the day, leaving state AGs increasingly alone on the front 
lines of consumer protection. Dodd-Frank gave state AGs the 
power to enforce federal consumer protection regulations, 
strongly resembling the CFPB’s power.100 The law acknowledged 
what the experience of recovering from the 2008 meltdown had 
taught: that both federal regulators and state AGs are more ef-
fective when they are able to coordinate.101 However, as federal 
regulators grow ever more passive regarding consumer protec-
tion, state AGs are once again left to hold companies accountable 
without support from the federal government. This is especially 
concerning given that only a handful of enforcement actions have 
ever been brought by state AGs under Dodd-Frank, and fewer 
still have been a cooperative effort between states.102 There is a 
growing enforcement gap, leaving consumers exposed to abuse 
and the economy vulnerable to lenders’ illegal and destructive 
practices. 
To be sure, state AGs are powerful warriors in the fight 
against financial disasters. The history of the national state-fed-
eral mortgage settlement shows that AGs can, and do, win mean-
ingful victories for consumers.103 Moreover, residents of states 
with protective regulations were better off than those in more 
permissive states following the 2008 crash.104 However, both 
then and now, state AGs are, by their very nature, unable to fully 
 
 99. See Newbery, supra note 97 (“Several private banks are now offering 
various zero-down mortgage programs or down payment assistance programs 
for higher-risk borrowers.”). 
 100. See Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attor-
neys General After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 128–36 (2013) (describing 
“the concurrent-enforcement powers enjoyed by SAGs [state attorneys general] 
under the Dodd-Frank Act”). 
 101. See supra Part II. 
 102. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE REGULATORS’ DODD-FRANK ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITY: INITIAL SUITS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 2–4, http://apps 
.americanbar.org/buslaw/committees/CL310000pub/newsletter/201510/fa_4 
.pdf (cataloguing Dodd-Frank state attorneys general cases among seven states, 
including two cooperative efforts). 
 103. See supra Part II. 
 104. See Dan Freed, Florida, Nevada Can’t Win for Losing on Mortgage Cri-
sis, THESTREET (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12832469/1/ 
florida-nevada-cant-win-for-losing-on-mortgage-crisis.html. 
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protect their constituents from the dangers of financial melt-
down in a globalized economy.105 As discussed above, they are 
well-positioned to fight predatory lending and other abuses that 
take place on a local level.106 When they have the ability and po-
litical will, AGs can work alone or together to battle Dodd-Frank 
violations taking place in their jurisdictions.107 And as the mort-
gage settlement shows, AGs can also be effective on a national 
scale when they work together across state lines.108 
Through inter-state cooperation, state AGs can mount excel-
lent responses to financial crises. However, even the best re-
sponses cannot restore Americans to the position they would be 
in if these crises did not occur in the first place. The real goal is 
effective prevention rather than response, and it is one that AGs 
are simply not equipped to accomplish on their own or even to-
gether. No amount of coalition-building between AGs or negoti-
ations with financial institutions can achieve what the United 
States needs: comprehensive, effective consumer protection. 
Constitutionally,109 and as a matter of sheer practicality, the 
federal government must be involved in regulating inter-state 
financial institutions and protecting consumers across the 
 
 105. See Totten, supra note 100, at 123–25 (noting the roadblock in “federal 
agencies . . . preempt[ing] state laws aimed at the abusive lending practiced fed-
eral regulators refused to address,” including the federal government blocking 
state anti-predatory lending laws and enforcement actions). 
 106. See CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE 
PRACTICES LAWS 10–11 (Mar. 2018), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/ 
udap-report.pdf (“UDAP [Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices] statutes 
bring consumer justice to the state, local, and individual level. They enable state 
agencies [such as the Attorney General] to protect their citizens by responding 
quickly to emerging frauds.”). 
 107. See Totten, supra note 100, at 145–49 (“Title X [of the Dodd-Frank Act] 
authorizes a state attorney general to bring a civil action . . . . The forum provi-
sion in section 1042(a)(1) also has implications for bringing multi-state actions 
to enforce federal consumer financial law. While subject to criticism, these ac-
tions have been a powerful tool in the hands of state attorneys general.”). 
 108. See Prior, supra note 33 (“The 16-month robo-signing saga ends with a 
$26 billion settlement. Nearly all 50 states agreed to a deal with [mortgage ser-
vicers] Bank of America (BAC), JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Wells Fargo (WFC), 
Ally Financial (GJM), and Citigroup (C).”). 
 109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have power] [t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”); West 
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (“The Commerce Clause 
also limits the power of [a state] . . . to adopt regulations that discriminate 
against interstate commerce.”). 
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United States.110 Recovering from the crisis required a systemic, 
national response.111 Ensuring that such a preventable catastro-
phe does not reoccur will require more coordinated oversight, not 
less. Much has changed since 2008, but the tendency of large 
corporations to focus singularly on profits, without considering 
consumer well-being or the overall health of the economy, has 
not.112 In many respects, this drive seems to be stronger than it 
has ever been before.113 There is an ever-present risk that big 
companies will once again grind the economy into the ground to 
make a quick buck. Americans deserve holistic state and federal 
oversight that will protect them from the danger of repeating the 
most disastrous financial meltdowns in U.S. history, and they 
should demand no less. 
  CONCLUSION   
The current administration’s objective to dissolve many 
post-crisis laws, especially those that have proved favorable for 
 
 110. For instance, the federal government’s response to the Great Depres-
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Great Recession, “[t]he Obama administration implemented a number of im-
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consumers, is ill-advised. Reviving the economy from the eco-
nomic crisis required transparent policy making and institu-
tional accountability. Dismantling these policies will destroy the 
foundation upon which the United States has restored and main-
tained a healthy economy. In the years following the crisis, state 
AGs led efforts to address consumer protection, especially in fi-
nancial services. Although the circumstances today are different 
than those of ten years ago, similar action remains necessary. 
Consumers must know the resources available for their protec-
tion and how to access those resources. In addition, consumers 
should look to their leaders to take groundbreaking legal action 
and implement legislative solutions aimed at consumer protec-
tion, and expect that more protections can be implemented and 
enforced by a federal bureau—regardless of its title. 
 
